國家外貿專業(yè)外文資料翻譯---中國的自由貿易談判經濟學，安全和外交政策

1、<p>　　畢業(yè)設計(論文)外文資料翻譯</p><p>　　附件1：外文資料翻譯譯文</p><p>　　中國的自由貿易談判：經濟學，安全和外交政策</p><p>　　80年代后期以來，由鄧小平領導的改革開放來臨了，中國一直奉行出口導向型的貿易政策。這一直伴隨著國內農業(yè)和工業(yè)的重組，私有化和國際化的發(fā)展。但長期以來，中國一直積極與世界各地的合作伙伴進行

2、全球貿易，并已進入到眾多的貿易和經濟協(xié)定中去。北京的領導人認為進入自由貿易協(xié)定（FTA）的時間相對較快，是與歐洲、北美、澳大利亞和新西蘭相比的，尤其與中國的亞洲鄰國，如韓國、泰國和新加坡相比。例如，在2003年當馮慧蘭和Gooptu的36個亞洲國家完成或擬進行的自由貿易協(xié)定名單，該名單包括12項，涉及新加坡，十項涉及韓國和日本，再加上超過過半協(xié)定涉及泰國，香港，臺灣及東盟。然而，中國只有兩次出現在名單上。在那時三方會談沒有加上對中國雙邊

3、自由貿易協(xié)定協(xié)議，及其關于中國 - 東盟自由貿易區(qū)和東盟的議程。</p><p>　　從那時起，中國已成為極有力追求自由貿易的國家。由2000年代中期，它與27個國家和地區(qū)，與9個自由貿易區(qū)建立了更緊密的經貿關系協(xié)定“（CEPA），國家數量已占中國現已簽署了自由貿易協(xié)定的五分之一。它是與海灣合作委員會六個成員國和由五名成員組成的在自由貿易協(xié)定談判非洲關稅的聯盟， 還包括澳大利亞。中國也正在調查與冰島自由貿易區(qū)的可

4、行性。北京還提出了自由貿易協(xié)定的成員與上海合作組織（SCO）、新加坡、甚至與印度的合作。此外，中國分析家正在尋找中國 - 日本和中國 - 韓國自由貿易協(xié)定以確定能否進入中國 - 日本 - 韓國的可行性。</p><p>　　本章追溯最近的事態(tài)發(fā)展，并說明選定的自由貿易區(qū)談判情況。此外，它回顧中國文化對中國領導人的利益和戰(zhàn)略方面的自由貿易協(xié)定的影響。最后，它采用了米雷婭·索利斯和堅田沙織一套假說，本書的框

5、架分析了中國在參與與一般亞洲國家的自由貿易協(xié)定的動機，特別是關于跨區(qū)域自由貿易協(xié)定。本章的目的有三個方面：第一，總結對中國的自由貿易區(qū)的倡議；第二，以評估中國的動機；第三,探索索利斯的實用性和堅田的概念框架對亞洲跨區(qū)域主義有關的工作分析。因為并不否認中國本身的獨特性，由此本文假定中國的自由貿易區(qū)政策與亞洲鄰國和其他主要經濟體的貿易政策相比，可能存在的有益的條件。綜合中國的情況，索利斯和堅田假設，政府自由貿易協(xié)定談判的動機的具體影響。中國

6、最近的興趣是自由貿易協(xié)定談判與虛擬經濟杠桿的動機似乎是否一致。此外，跨區(qū)域自由貿易協(xié)定，也對中國的安全與外交利益產生影響。為了加強該國的“綜合國力”，北京采取長期的戰(zhàn)略、經濟舉措，如自由貿易協(xié)定談判，北京積極的政治態(tài)度和安全問題都得到了重視。 </p><p>　　一個遲到的自由貿易協(xié)定。在解釋中國為什么入世時間相對較晚。有兩種可能性的解釋，作為由Elaine S.桂建議，第一種可能性是：中國

7、領導人認為，參與全球和地區(qū)的貿易框架，可以為中國的利益服務，比中國雙邊貿易要好。世界貿易組織（WTO）的成員以及領導的極力追求，其在亞太經合組織中的作用給予這一假說支持。因此，國務院總理朱容基在2000年11月建議了在東盟建立的一個可能的自由貿易協(xié)定。中國觀察家吃驚，因為它似乎構成了從中國以前的多邊貿易到自由貿易協(xié)定的必然。然而，從另一個角度這可以解釋為中國日益增長的興趣，協(xié)議促成亞洲區(qū)域貿易。作為中國分析師劉昌黎概括起來，“貿易的速度

8、自由化（根據WTO）取決于最慢的船，“中國是信號，它打算加入快一個潛在的區(qū)域化，據另一位分析師，中國領導人已經體會到，“經濟形式影響中國經濟全球化的快速發(fā)展?！按送猓袊恼勁刑岢隽怂麄兊默F實認識，即在多邊談判中的影響力有限。這是不僅在WTO的情況下，這也是在亞太經合組織和亞歐會議（ASEM）的表現，論壇涵蓋一些世界上最大的經濟體，如美國，日本和歐盟。但是，亞太經合組織沒有太大的進展，9日的亞歐會議，作為一個非正式的羅格論壇，</

9、p><p>　　這不僅是因為北京的決策者在忙于調整決策。事實上，中國的自由貿易區(qū)談判的評論員抱怨說，雖然中國的企業(yè)和政府部門已作出的重大調整應對中國在加入世貿組織的要求，中國領導人決定加快參與區(qū)域化。因此，貿易自由化的第一假設僅部分證實了由中國 - 東盟自由貿易區(qū)項目和中國在區(qū)域生態(tài)合作上的新興趣。在2000年展開，桂的第二個假說斷定，直到最近顯示，中國并不需要雙邊自由貿易協(xié)定，以實現其貿易目標。這是因為其談判可以使

10、用該國廣闊的市場吸引力，以爭取有利的貿易優(yōu)惠，而不提交正式的自由貿易協(xié)定。然而，許多中國的貿易伙伴開始架設微妙的新的障礙，或從事不包括中國優(yōu)惠貿易協(xié)定。由于中國的貿易范圍和數量的增加，中國所面臨的更多的關稅歧視，貿易和行政保護的技術壁壘，如反傾銷案件。世貿組織已被證明無效遏止這些關稅和非關稅貿易壁壘，使中國的政策制定者降級其對世貿組織的依賴，尤其是在2003年坎昆僵局會議。正是在這個時候，中國的貿易政策被認為是有奉行自由貿易協(xié)定的可能性

11、的。因此，因這兩個假設，發(fā)現中國的多邊框架和非正式的貿易優(yōu)惠更多有利于其發(fā)展，20世紀90年代正式自由貿易協(xié)定不再適用于在新的世紀發(fā)展。他們沒有預料到中國的</p><p>　　在自由貿易協(xié)定中關于中國的利益調查顯示，學術文獻的調查準確解釋了中國不斷增長的自由貿易協(xié)定中的利益。余斌指出，雖然更多的智囊團和民間社會行動者已經成為中國20世紀80年代以來的外交政策參與者，一部分外交部官員的作用仍然中庸的。他認為，中國

12、的官方外交政策決策者往往不信任在國外政治學術寫作，但觀察者的舉動，像桂以上這些研究，是過時的。雖然專家和決策者之間確實存在差距，它作為一個更加務實的中國外交正在縮小發(fā)展政策和更官僚的決策過程。邦尼格拉澤和菲利普·桑德斯認為，“更多元化和競爭的政策環(huán)境是智囊團更大的影響力的分析師。“戴維·蘭普頓還指出，外交政策問題的復雜性，導致中國外交政策的決策專業(yè)化，這給了中國分析家的機會提出建議。蘭普頓強調說：“在經濟領域需要專門

13、的研究已成為日益突出的現象，“有的研究是“越來越依賴于內部和外部的研究。”在過去的幾年中，中國的分析家們廣泛接受（雖然有爭議）的概念，是雙邊自由貿易協(xié)定將有助于中國與這些交易問題和自由貿易協(xié)定是對多邊貿易協(xié)定的補充?！八麄兂姓J，加入WTO，加快中國經濟市場化，但中國必須進一步擴大和深化在區(qū)域經濟一體化的區(qū)域和雙邊的貿易手段的自由化，中國的領</p><p>　　附件2：外文資料原文</p><

14、p>　　China’s Free Trade Negotiations: Economics, Security,</p><p>　　and Diplomacy</p><p>　　Since the late 1980s and the advent of reforms led by Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued an increasingl

15、y export-oriented trade policy. This trend has been accompanied by selective domestic agricultural and industrial restructuring, privatization and internationalization.. But while China has long been a vigorous global tr

16、ader and has entered into numerous trade and economic agreements with partners around the world, Beijing’s leaders are relative newcomers to free trade agreements (FTAs). This is </p><p>　　Since then, China

17、has become more vigorous in its pursuit of free trade agreements. By the mid-2000s it was talking with 27 countries and regions regarding the establishment of nine FTAs or Closer Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA),cov

18、ering over one-fifth of China’s total trade.4 China has now signed FTAs with the ten-member ASEAN group, Chile, Pakistan and New Zealand. It is in FTA negotiations with the six-member GCC and with the five-member South A

19、frican Customs Union, and with Australia a</p><p>　　This chapter traces these recent developments and describes selected FTA talks</p><p>　　China is currently engaged in or has recently conclude

20、d. Further, it reviews the Chinese literature about Chinese leaders’ interest in and strategy regarding FTAs. Finally, it employs a set of hypotheses put forward by Mireya Solís and Saori Katadain the framework chap

21、ter of this book to analyze China’s motives for engaging in FTAs in general, and cross-regional FTAs in particular. The purpose of our chapteris thus threefold: first to summarize China’s FTA initiative, second to assess

22、 China’s mo</p><p>　　A Late Arrival to FTAs</p><p>　　China’s relatively late arrival in the vibrant FTA negotiating arena may be explained by two possibilities. As suggested by Elaine S. Kwei, t

23、he first possibility is that China’s leaders saw China’s interests served best by participation in global and regional trade frameworks rather than bilateral arrangements.5 China’s assiduous pursuit of World Trade Organi

24、zation (WTO) membership and its strong leadership role in the APEC forum give support to this hypothesis. Thus Premier Zhu Rongji’s agreeme</p><p>　　Furthermore, China’s negotiators developed a realistic und

25、erstanding of their limited influence in multilateral talks. This is the case not only in the WTO but also in APEC and the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM), fora which encompassed some of the world’s largest economies such as

26、the United States, Japan and the EU. But APEC was not making much progress,9 and ASEM, as an informal dialogue forum, seemed even less effective in facilitating trade talks. With its trade growing more than 40 times from

27、 U</p><p>　　On the other hand, in the early part of the decade, China moved cautiously in developing the FTA with ASEAN and in the interim did not undertake bilateral FTAs, not least because Beijing’s policy

28、 makers were preoccupied with adjusting China’s economy to the consequences of accession to the WTO in November 2001. Indeed, a commentator on China’s FTA talks complained that although China’s enterprises and government

29、 departments had made significant adjustments to comply with requirement for China’s </p><p>　　Kwei’s second hypothesis posits that China until recently did not need bilateral FTAs to achieve its trade aims.

30、 This was because its negotiators could use the attractiveness of the country’s vast market to secure favorable trade deals without having to commit to formal FTAs. However, many of China’s trade partners had begun erect

31、ing subtle new barriers or engaging in preferential trade agreements that excluded China. As China’s trade scope and volume increased, China faced more tariff discrimin</p><p>　　China’s Interest in FTAs</

32、p><p>　　A survey of scholarly literature on China’s policy making yields more nuanced and accurate explanations of China’s growing interest in FTAs. Bin Yu noted that although more think-tank and civil society

33、actors had become involved in China’s foreign policy making since the 1980s, the role of the officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remained central. He suggested that China’s official foreign policy makers tended

34、to distrust scholarly writing on foreign policy.12 However, that observation, </p><p>　　In the past few years, Chinese analysts have come to accept the widespread (although contested) notion that bilateral F

35、TAs will help China deal with these issues and that FTAs are complementary to multilateral trade agreements, or “building blocks.”16 They acknowledge that joining the WTO has accelerated marketization of the Chinese econ

36、omy, but that China must further widen and deepen its participation in regional economic integration by means of regional and bilateral trade liberalization agre</p><p>　　Furthermore, Chinese analysts became

37、 concerned about China’s exclusion from preferential arrangements. They noted that by the end of 2004, 307 regional trade agreements (RTAs) had been or were being negotiated, and that most of them were FTAs. More importa

38、ntly, over 80% of these FTAs were negotiated in the past decade. In 2004 alone, 16 FTAs were concluded…but none with China.19 Chinese analysts also noted that, although the number of FTAs in East Asia remained small, the

39、 Asia-Pacific as a whole</p><p>　　Besides this defensive motive – to avoid discrimination – two other economic reasons were put forward in favor of FTAs. First, FTAs might help alleviate China’s energy probl

40、em and enhance energy security, a key strategic goal.22 Closer economic relations with oil producers would help ensure more secure and diverse sources of energy. Second, FTAs might enhance the efficiency and productivity

41、 of China’s somewhat old-fashioned command enterprises, partly because of the scale effect and partly becau</p><p>　　Against this background, it is no surprise that China began three bilateral FTA negotiatio

42、ns in 2004, first with New Zealand and then with Australia and Chile. It is significant that all of these were cross-regional FTAs (or CRTAs). China’s trade leaders made no secret of their intention to use the impending

43、CRTA with Chile as a “bridge” to talks with the Mercosur (the Common Market of the South, which included Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) and other Latin American countries. In Beiji</p><p>　　China h

44、as also endorsed the ASEAN Plus Three vision of an East Asian Community that might lead to a regional free trade arrangement. It has also broached the idea of a Northeast Asia trilateral FTA with South Korea and Japan an

45、d has engaged in trade talks with India, Pakistan and the GCC, each of which has the potential to lead to further CRTAs. While it is true that many of these talks may progress no further than trade and investment framewo