國(guó)際貿(mào)易外文翻譯---中國(guó)和東亞的外商直接投資

1、<p>　　南 京 工 程 學(xué) 院 </p><p>　　畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)文獻(xiàn)資料翻譯</p><p><b>　?。ㄔ募白g文） </b></p><p>　　原文名稱(chēng)：Foreign Direct Investment in China and East Asia </p><p>　　課題名稱(chēng): 中

2、國(guó)和東亞的外商直接投資 </p><p>　　學(xué)生姓名： 學(xué) 號(hào)： </p><p>　　指導(dǎo)老師： </p><p>　　所在系部： 經(jīng)濟(jì)管理學(xué)院 </p><p>　　專(zhuān)業(yè)名稱(chēng)

3、： 國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易 </p><p>　　2011 年 3 月 南 京 </p><p>　　原文：Foreign Direct Investment in China and East Asia</p><p>　　Recent Policy Concerns </p><p>　　It is n

4、ot hard to find various analysts, commentators and policymakers in Asia who have voiced concerns about the emergence of China and that China is adversely affecting direct investment flows into their economies. In Novembe

5、r 2002, Singaporean Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong (who has since become the Prime Minister of Singapore) commented that “Southeast Asian countries are under intense competitive pressure, as their former activitie

6、s, especially labor-intensive manufacturing, migrate </p><p>　　Is China's FDI policy a friend or an enemy to its Asian neighbors? What determines foreign direct investment flows into the Asian and other

7、economies? Is there a “China Effect”? To get some insights as to what methodology we should pursue, we now look at selectively some relevant academic literature. </p><p>　　Brainard (1997) empirically examine

8、s the determinants of the ratio of U.S. export sales to total foreign sales (the sum of export sales by sales by foreign affiliates) by industry. She uses a framework of focusing on factors that favor concentration of pr

9、oduction (i.e. favoring exports) vs. proximity to overseas customers (i.e. favoring sales by foreign affiliates). The explanatory variables include freight costs to the export market, tariffs of the host country, per cap

10、ita gross domestic produc</p><p>　　Gastanaga, Nugent and Pashamova (1998) focus on policy reforms in developing countries as determinants of foreign direct investment inflows. They employ both ordinary least

11、 squares as well as panel estimations. The expected rates of growth, the corporate tax rates, the degree of corruption and the degree of openness to foreign direct investment are all important determinants of foreign dir

12、ect investment flows into these economies. Hines (1995) and Wei (1997) both examine the impact of institutio</p><p>　　Wei (1997) uses OECD direct investment data and shows that both corruption and tax rates

13、have negative effects on foreign direct investment flows. Wei’s estimations are cross-sectional.</p><p>　　The Empirical Model </p><p>　　In this section we provide an empirical model to estimate

14、the impact of China </p><p>　　on the inward direct investment of various Asian economies. The economies we examine include Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Philippines

15、 and Indonesia.3 The years examined in this analysis are from 1985 to 2001. The strategy here is to control for all the standard explanatory variables of foreign direct investment in the Asian economies. But we add an ad

16、ditional variable representing the China factor. To proxy for the China Effect, we choose the level of </p><p>　　The basic regression model for inward foreign direct investment for Asian countries and for Ch

17、ina are written as a linear specification of the following form: </p><p>　　ln(AFDIi,t) = α0 + α1ln(CLNFDI,t) + β1ln(AGROWTHi,t) + β2ln(ACORRUPTi,t) + β3ln(ADUTYi,t) + β4ln(AGOVi,t) + β5ln(AWAGEi,t) </p>

18、;<p>　　2 Other related literature includes Bao, Chang, Sachs and Woo (2002), Fung, Iizaka and Siu (2003), Zhang and Song (2001), etc. </p><p>　　) + βln(ATEL) + βln(AINCOME) + βln(OUTFLOW) +β6ln(AOPENi

19、,t)+β7ln(AILLITi,t) + β8ln(ACPTAXi,t9i,t10i,t11t</p><p>　　ln(CLNFDIt) = γ0 + δ1ln(AFDIi,t) + ρ1ln(CGROWTHt) + ρ2ln(CCORUPTt) ρ3ln(CDUTYt) + ρ4ln(CGOVt) + ρ5ln(CWAGEt) + ρ6ln(COPEN t) + ρ7ln(CINCOMEt) </p&

20、gt;<p>　　where the subscript “i” and “t” stands for country i at period t and the variables used in this analysis are defined below. </p><p>　　AFDI i,t : the level of inward foreign direct investment

21、in the ith Asian economies </p><p>　　in year t. </p><p>　　CLNFDI t : inward foreign direct investment into China in year t. </p><p>　　AGROWTH i,t : growth rate of GDP of country i a

22、t time t. </p><p>　　CGROWTH t : growth rate of GDP of China at time t. </p><p>　　ACORRUPT i,t : an index of corruption of county i at time t. </p><p>　　CCORRUPT t : an index of corr

23、uption of China at time t. </p><p>　　ADUTYi,t : import duty of country i at time t. </p><p>　　CDUTYt : import duty of China at time t. </p><p>　　AWAGE i,t : average wage in manufact

24、uring of country i at time t. </p><p>　　CWAGE t : average wage in manufacturing of China at time t. </p><p>　　AOPEN i,t : the share of exports and imports in GDP of country i at time t. </p&g

25、t;<p>　　COPEN t : the share of exports and imports in GDP of China at time t. </p><p>　　AILLIT i,t : the percentage of people who are illiterate of country i at time t. </p><p>　　3 In fut

26、ure studies, we intend to include other Asian economies such as India and Pakistan. </p><p>　　ATAX i,t : corporate tax rate of country i at time t. </p><p>　　AGOV i,t : an index of government st

27、ability of country i at time t. </p><p>　　CGOV t : an index of government stability of China at time t. </p><p>　　ATEL i,t : number of telephone mainlines per 1,000 people of country i at time t

28、. </p><p>　　AINCOME i,t : per capita GDP of country i at time t. </p><p>　　CINCOME t : per capita GDP of China at time t </p><p>　　OUTFLOWt total outflows of direct investment to th

29、e world at time t </p><p>　　The independent variables examined in the analysis are believed to exert an influence on inward foreign direct investment in each country of Asia and China by changing the investm

30、ent environment through institutional and policy changes as well as the relevant economic conditions. </p><p>　　The main variable that we shall examine in this paper is the proxy for the China effect CLNFDI.

31、 There are at least two aspects that we should consider here. First, in examining which low-wage export platform to locate, multinationals may choose between investing in China vs. investing in another Asian country, say

32、 Thailand. In this case, the multinationals will study the whole host of factors, including wage rates, political risks, infrastructure, etc. that would make a country desirable as a si</p><p>　　The second a

33、spect is the production and resource linkages between a growing China and the rest of Asia. In manufacturing, this takes of the form of further specialization and growing fragmentation of the production processes. An inv

34、estor sets up factories in both China and Thailand to take advantage of their respective competitiveness in distinct stages of productions. Components and parts are then traded among China and other Asian economies. An i

35、ncrease in China’s FDI is then positively relate</p><p>　　A substantial literature has developed confirming empirically the importance of the size of the host market and the growth factor measured by GDP per

36、 capita or GDP growth. The foreign investors that target the local market are assumed to be more attracted to the country with higher growth rate of GDP as it indicates a larger potential demand for their product. The ef

37、fect of the variable on their investment incentive therefore is assumed to be larger than the effect on those who are not focusing </p><p>　　characterized by relatively large economies of scale, the importan

38、ce of the market size or it’s growth is magnified. This is because they can exploit scales economies only after the market attains a certain threshold size. As the variables (the growth of GDP and per capita GDP) are use

39、d as indicators for the market size and the potential for the products of foreign investors, the expected signs for these variables are positive. </p><p>　　Since the cost of labor is a major component of the

40、 cost function, various versions of the wage variables are frequently tested in the literature. A high wage, other things being equal, deters inward foreign direct investment (FDI). This must be particularly so for the f

41、irms which engage in labor-intensive production activities. Therefore, conventionally, the expected sign for this variable is negative. However, there are no consistent empirical results for the effect of labor cost on t

42、he invest</p><p>　　The level of human capital is demonstrated to be an another important determinant of the marginal productivity of capital. It has been shown in various studies that skill-related variables

43、 are host country specific. When a host country is more appealing to labor-intensive foreign investment that requires a relatively lower level of skills, the importance of the human capital variable tends to be small. On

44、 the other hand, labor skills can be a more significant factor for a host country, in which </p><p>　　We also examine the significance of institutional factors in the determination of FDI by incorporating th

45、e level of corruption and the stability of each government. Corruption can discourage FDI by inducing a higher cost of doing business. Hines (1995) shows that FDI from the United States grew more rapidly in less corrupt

46、countries than in more corrupt countries after 1977. Wei (1997) presents alternative explanation of the large negative and significant effect of corruption on FDI. Unlike taxe</p><p>　　Also included in the a

47、nalysis are policy-related variables, tariff barriers proxied by import duty, corporate tax rates, and openness to foreign trade. The effect of tariffs on the behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs) is methodologica

48、lly demonstrated by Horst (1971). He predicts that in the face of higher tariffs imposed by the host countries, other things being equal, MNEs will increase its production abroad and decrease its exports. More recent mod

49、els highlight the effect of tariffs on</p><p>　　AOPEN is included to examine the importance of openness of an economy to international trade. The variable measures the degree of general trade restrictions of

50、 each country. Following the same line of reasoning above, a negative relationship between openness and market-seeking FDI is expected, and a positive relationship is expected for export-oriented FDI. </p><p&g

51、t;<b>　　19 </b></p><p>　　Another policy-related variable that can influence the host country’s location advantage is the host country’s corporate or other tax rates. The MNEs, as global profit max

52、imizers, can be assumed to be sensitive to tax factors, since they have a direct effect on their profits. The evidence of significant negative influences of corporate tax rates are reported in previous studies by Wei (19

53、97), Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998), and Hsiao (2001). </p><p>　　Finally, to control for the supply side of the direct investment, we include OUTFLOW, the total global outflows of FDI for each year.

54、4 All variables are transformed into logarithms. Data sources and additional explanations of variables are given in Appendix A. </p><p>　　The formulation of the empirical model is then specified as follows.

55、</p><p>　　ln(AFDIi,t) = ln(AFDIi,t) = α0 + α1ln(CLNFDI,t) + β1ln(AGROWTHi,t) + β2ln(ACORRUPTi,t) + β3ln(ADUTYi,t) + β4ln(AGOVi,t) + β5ln(AWAGEi,t) +β6ln(AOPENi,t)+β7ln(AILLITi,t) + β8ln(ACPTAXi,t) + β9ln(ATE

56、Li,t) + β10ln(AINCOMEi,t) + β11ln(OUTFLOWt) + ui + ei,t</p><p>　　ln(CLNFDIt) == γ0 + δ1ln(AFDIi,t) + ρ1ln(CGROWTHt) + ρ2ln(CCORUPTt) ρ3ln(CDUTYt) + ρ4ln(CGOVt) + ρ5ln(CWAGEt) + ρ6ln(COPEN t) + ρ7ln(CINCOMEt)

57、 + vi + wi,t </p><p>　　The above simultaneous equation system is estimated by the two stage least squares. </p><p>　　Another possible determinant of FDI is the level of exchange rates. However,

58、as highlighted by Russ (2004), there are many conflicting empirical studies concerning the significance and even the sign of the exchange rate variable. </p><p>　　翻譯：中國(guó)和東亞的外商直接投資</p><p><b>

59、;　　最近的政策問(wèn)題</b></p><p>　　我們不難發(fā)現(xiàn),很多亞洲的分析師,評(píng)論家和決策者都已經(jīng)表示關(guān)注中國(guó),中國(guó)的出現(xiàn)相反地會(huì)影響直接投資流入經(jīng)濟(jì)中.2002年11月,新家坡副總理Lee Hsien Loong(之后為新家坡總理)提議"東南亞國(guó)家在激烈的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)壓力下,正如他們之前的商業(yè)活動(dòng)，特別是勞動(dòng)密集型制造業(yè)，已逐漸轉(zhuǎn)移到中國(guó)。這種大規(guī)模轉(zhuǎn)移的指標(biāo)之一，實(shí)際上是東南亞過(guò)去常吸引外國(guó)

60、直接投資是東北亞地區(qū)的兩倍，但這個(gè)比例恰恰是相反的。（中國(guó)在線(xiàn)，2002年11月14日）。據(jù)振興公社，韓國(guó)的國(guó)營(yíng)貿(mào)易和投資促進(jìn)機(jī)構(gòu)，在大多數(shù)亞洲國(guó)家中，由于全球投資者正在越來(lái)越傾向于投資中國(guó)，導(dǎo)致韓國(guó)的外國(guó)直接投資日趨下降。（2002年8月27日，韓國(guó)時(shí)報(bào)）。世界經(jīng)濟(jì)論壇亞洲主任弗蘭克·J·里克特表示，如果亞洲國(guó)家不采取審慎和務(wù)實(shí)的步驟，變得和中國(guó)一樣具有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，這些流入本國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的外國(guó)直接投資將受到不利影響（新海峽時(shí)

61、報(bào)-管理時(shí)報(bào)3月9日，2002）。此外，臺(tái)灣副總理林信義說(shuō)過(guò)，面對(duì)中國(guó)內(nèi)地經(jīng)濟(jì)的迅速崛起，臺(tái)灣必須采取有效措施，以增加競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。臺(tái)灣已實(shí)施 “南向”政策來(lái)鼓勵(lì)臺(tái)灣把投資方向從內(nèi)地轉(zhuǎn)向東南亞國(guó)家（臺(tái)灣中央通訊社，2002年11月21日）。</p><p>　　中國(guó)的外國(guó)直接投資政策是其亞洲鄰國(guó)的朋友還是敵人？是什么決定著外國(guó)直接投資流入亞洲和其他經(jīng)濟(jì)體的？是“中國(guó)效應(yīng)”嗎？為了得到一些啟發(fā)，我們應(yīng)該追求什么樣的方法，

62、我們現(xiàn)在有選擇性地來(lái)看看一些相關(guān)的學(xué)術(shù)文獻(xiàn)。</p><p>　　布雷納德（1997）按行業(yè)實(shí)證考察美國(guó)的出口銷(xiāo)售比例對(duì)國(guó)外銷(xiāo)售總額（國(guó)外分支機(jī)構(gòu)的銷(xiāo)售出口總額）中的決定性因素。她使用框架理念，集中對(duì)比專(zhuān)注于生產(chǎn)（即有利于出口）和拉近海外客戶(hù)（即有利于國(guó)外分支機(jī)構(gòu)的銷(xiāo)售額）這兩個(gè)要素。解釋性變數(shù)包括了出口市場(chǎng)的運(yùn)費(fèi)，東道國(guó)的關(guān)稅，人均國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值（GDP），企業(yè)所得稅稅率，貿(mào)易的措施和外國(guó)直接投資的開(kāi)放，工廠和企

63、業(yè)規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)的措施。她還增加了體現(xiàn)一個(gè)國(guó)家是否在過(guò)去十年中有過(guò)政治政變隱形措施。在她的隨機(jī)效應(yīng)估測(cè)中，幾乎所有的系數(shù)都有正確且顯著的跡象。而主要例外的因素是企業(yè)的稅率，它有如與預(yù)期中相反的跡象。</p><p>　　Gastanaga，紐金特和Pashamova（1998）重點(diǎn)關(guān)注于作為發(fā)展中國(guó)家外國(guó)直接投資流入決定因素，即政策改革。他們不僅采用大眾意見(jiàn)也采納專(zhuān)業(yè)小組的評(píng)估。經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的預(yù)期率，企業(yè)稅率，腐敗程度和外

64、國(guó)直接投資的開(kāi)放程度都是導(dǎo)致外國(guó)直接投資流入這些經(jīng)濟(jì)體的重要因素。海因斯（1995）和Wei（1997）都測(cè)試了制度性因素對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的影響。海因斯表示，通過(guò)采用腐敗指數(shù)， 1977年以后，美國(guó)的外國(guó)直接投資的增長(zhǎng)速度更快于少腐敗的國(guó)家。Wei（1997）使用經(jīng)合組織直接投資的數(shù)據(jù)表明，腐敗和稅率對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的流入都具有負(fù)面影響。Wei的估測(cè)是具有代表性的。</p><p><b>　　實(shí)證模型&l

65、t;/b></p><p>　　在這篇文章里,我們提供了一個(gè)實(shí)證模型來(lái)估計(jì)中國(guó)對(duì)亞洲各經(jīng)濟(jì)體的外來(lái)直接投資的影響 。我們的經(jīng)濟(jì)檢查包括香港、新加坡、臺(tái)灣,韓國(guó)、泰國(guó)、馬來(lái)西亞、菲律賓及印尼。我們從1985年至2001年的數(shù)據(jù)中分析。這些策略是為了控制所有亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)體的外國(guó)直接投資的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)系數(shù)。但是基于中國(guó)的實(shí)際情況增加了額外的系數(shù)。用來(lái)代表中國(guó)的影響，我們選擇中國(guó)的外國(guó)直接投資流入 。 顯然，中國(guó)的外國(guó)直接投資

66、也可以依賴(lài)這些亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)體系的外來(lái)直接投資。 為了占領(lǐng)中國(guó)的外國(guó)直接投資流入以及亞洲其他經(jīng)濟(jì)體的外國(guó)直接投資流入的互惠關(guān)系，中國(guó)以及亞洲其他經(jīng)濟(jì)體的外國(guó)直接投資流入公式是可同時(shí)評(píng)估的。</p><p>　　基本回歸模型內(nèi)部的外國(guó)直接投資對(duì)亞洲國(guó)家和中國(guó)都可寫(xiě)為下列形式的線(xiàn)性規(guī)范 ：</p><p>　　ln(AFDIi,t) = α0 + α1ln(CLNFDI,t) + β1ln(AGRO

67、WTHi,t) + β2ln(ACORRUPTi,t) + β3ln(ADUTYi,t) + β4ln(AGOVi,t) + β5ln(AWAGEi,t) ) + βln(ATEL) + βln(AINCOME) + βln(OUTFLOW) +β6ln(AOPENi,t)+β7ln(AILLITi,t) + β8ln(ACPTAXi,t9i,t10i,t11t</p><p>　　ln(CLNFDIt) = γ

68、0 + δ1ln(AFDIi,t) + ρ1ln(CGROWTHt) + ρ2ln(CCORUPTt) ρ3ln(CDUTYt) + ρ4ln(CGOVt) + ρ5ln(CWAGEt) + ρ6ln(COPEN t) + ρ7ln(CINCOMEt) </p><p>　　其中下標(biāo)“i”和“T”在每一個(gè)周期t中代表國(guó)家 ，系數(shù)定義如下：</p><p>　　AFDI i,t : 時(shí)間t

69、亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)體系的外來(lái)直接投資的水平CLNFDI t : 時(shí)間t在中國(guó)的外來(lái)直接投資</p><p>　　AGROWTH i,t : 時(shí)間ti國(guó)GDP的增長(zhǎng)率</p><p>　　CGROWTH t : 時(shí)間t中國(guó)的GDP增長(zhǎng)率</p><p>　　ACORRUPT i,t : 時(shí)間ti國(guó)的腐敗指數(shù)</p><p>　　CCORRUPT t :

70、 時(shí)間t中國(guó)的腐敗指數(shù)</p><p>　　ADUTYi,t : 時(shí)間ti國(guó)的進(jìn)口稅</p><p>　　CDUTYt : 時(shí)間t中國(guó)的進(jìn)口稅</p><p>　　AWAGE i,t : 時(shí)間ti國(guó)制造業(yè)平均工資</p><p>　　CWAGE t : 時(shí)間t中國(guó)制造業(yè)平均工資</p><p>　　AOPEN i,t

71、: 時(shí)間ti國(guó)出口和進(jìn)口稅占GDP的份額</p><p>　　COPEN t : 時(shí)間t中國(guó)出口和進(jìn)口稅占GDP的份額</p><p>　　AILLIT i,t : 時(shí)間ti國(guó)文盲所占比例</p><p>　　ATAX i,t : 時(shí)間ti國(guó)的公司稅收率</p><p>　　AGOV i,t : 時(shí)間ti國(guó)政府穩(wěn)定指數(shù)</p>

72、<p>　　CGOV t : 時(shí)間t中國(guó)政府穩(wěn)定指數(shù)</p><p>　　ATEL i,t : 時(shí)間ti國(guó)每1000人所擁有移動(dòng)電話(huà)的數(shù)量</p><p>　　AINCOME i,t : 時(shí)間ti國(guó)的人均GDP </p><p>　　CINCOME t : 時(shí)間t中國(guó)的人均GDP </p><p>　　OUTFLOWt ：時(shí)間t的世

73、界直接總投資流出</p><p>　　獨(dú)立的分析研究認(rèn)為，可以通過(guò)改變體制和政策變化以及相關(guān)的經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況來(lái)影響中國(guó)內(nèi)在的外商直接投資及亞洲的每個(gè)國(guó)家的投資。</p><p>　　在本文中，我們應(yīng)審查的主要系數(shù)是對(duì)中國(guó)CLNFDI代理的影響。在這里我們應(yīng)該考慮至少有兩個(gè)方面。 首先，研究將公司設(shè)在哪個(gè)低工資國(guó)家，跨國(guó)公司可能會(huì)選擇在中國(guó)投資或者亞洲其他國(guó)家如泰國(guó)。 在這種情況下,跨國(guó)公司將研究

74、主體因素,包括工資、政治風(fēng)險(xiǎn)、基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施等,使之成為一個(gè)理想的低成本生產(chǎn)現(xiàn)場(chǎng)。在中國(guó)投資，將會(huì)減少另一個(gè)亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)的外國(guó)直接投資，比如說(shuō)泰國(guó)。CLNFDI 的標(biāo)志，根據(jù)這樣的說(shuō)法是否定的。我們稱(chēng)之為“投資轉(zhuǎn)移效應(yīng)”。 </p><p>　　第二個(gè)方面是越來(lái)越多的中國(guó)和亞洲其他地區(qū)的生產(chǎn)和資源之間的聯(lián)系。 在制造業(yè)中，這需要進(jìn)一步專(zhuān)業(yè)化，越來(lái)越多的分散形式的生產(chǎn)過(guò)程。投資者設(shè)立在中國(guó)和泰國(guó)工廠利用產(chǎn)品不同階段競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。然

75、后部件和零件在中國(guó)和其他亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)體之間的交易。中國(guó)的外國(guó)直接投資的增加與泰國(guó)的外國(guó)直接投資的增加呈正相關(guān)。一個(gè)不同但互補(bǔ)的論點(diǎn)是，由于中國(guó)的增長(zhǎng)，其市場(chǎng)規(guī)模增加，其對(duì)于礦產(chǎn)和資源的胃口也上升。隨后，外國(guó)公司涌入中國(guó)，在中國(guó)生產(chǎn)并在中國(guó)銷(xiāo)售。同一時(shí)間,其他的跨國(guó)公司也會(huì)投資亞洲其他地區(qū)的礦物質(zhì)和資源提取，出口給需要大量原材料的中國(guó)。因此預(yù)測(cè)CLNFDI是積極的。我們稱(chēng)這種效應(yīng)“的投資創(chuàng)造效應(yīng)”。從理論上講，我們不能確定投資創(chuàng)造和對(duì)中國(guó)的投

76、資轉(zhuǎn)移前的凈效應(yīng)。因此，它是重要的實(shí)證研究問(wèn)題，正如文中所論述的那樣。</p><p>　　大量的文獻(xiàn)資料表明市場(chǎng)規(guī)模大小的重要性，是衡量人均國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值和國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的重要因素。針對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)厥袌?chǎng)的外國(guó)投資被認(rèn)為更能吸引國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值增長(zhǎng)率較高的國(guó)家 ，因?yàn)樗砻饕粋€(gè)更大的潛在需求 。由于他們的投資動(dòng)機(jī)的影響，因此被認(rèn)為是對(duì)那些不注重國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)上比的影響較大</p><p>　　此外，作為外國(guó)投資

77、者在產(chǎn)業(yè)經(jīng)營(yíng)的投資其特點(diǎn)是擁有比較大的經(jīng)濟(jì)規(guī)模，市場(chǎng)規(guī)?；蛩慕?jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的重要性而被放大了。這是因?yàn)樗麄兛梢岳靡?guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)進(jìn)行運(yùn)作，只有在市場(chǎng)達(dá)到一定的大小。作為生產(chǎn)系數(shù)（國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值的增長(zhǎng)和人均國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值）的市場(chǎng)規(guī)模和潛在的外國(guó)投資者的產(chǎn)品指標(biāo)，這些預(yù)期變化是正向的。由于勞動(dòng)力成本是成本函數(shù)的重要組成部分，通過(guò)查閱各個(gè)年代的工資系數(shù)可得出：高工資，在其他條件相同的情況下，阻止外來(lái)的直接投資（FDI）這對(duì)于是從事勞工密集的生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)的企業(yè)

78、尤其如此。因此，在傳統(tǒng)意義上，預(yù)期這個(gè)變量的符號(hào)為負(fù)。但是，通過(guò)勞動(dòng)力成本上的投資激勵(lì)效應(yīng)的實(shí)證結(jié)果。雖然一些計(jì)量經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)研究表明勞動(dòng)力成本沒(méi)有顯著的作用，但是人類(lèi)的勞動(dòng)力成本和FDI之間確實(shí)存在正相關(guān)關(guān)系。后者的結(jié)果往往是歸結(jié)到勞動(dòng)生產(chǎn)率和人力資本水平上，也可反映在工資變量上。</p><p>　　人力資本水平是邊際生產(chǎn)力資本作為另一個(gè)決定性因素的證明。人們已經(jīng)發(fā)現(xiàn),在各項(xiàng)研究中表明這主要敘述的是東道國(guó)國(guó)家。當(dāng)一

79、個(gè)東道國(guó)更吸引外資時(shí),就對(duì)一個(gè)勞動(dòng)密集型的技術(shù)水平具有較低的重要性,人力資本水平需求往往是很小的。另一方面,技術(shù)可以作為許多國(guó)家以更多的資本、技術(shù)密集型投資集中的一個(gè)更重要因素。在分析中,我們利用文盲率作為代理水平和人力資本。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)發(fā)達(dá)的地區(qū)利用一個(gè)優(yōu)質(zhì)的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施相對(duì)于其他擁有1000人的電話(huà)線(xiàn)通道的代理水平更能吸引外國(guó)公司的投資。</p><p>　　我們還發(fā)現(xiàn)制度因素的重要性會(huì)使FDI與腐敗和國(guó)家的穩(wěn)定緊密

80、聯(lián)系起來(lái)。腐敗可以阻礙FDI發(fā)展，這也包括一項(xiàng)大的投入。Hines(1995)美國(guó)的外國(guó)直接投資增長(zhǎng)使腐敗程度較低的國(guó)家比一些更腐敗的國(guó)家在1977年后更迅速。偉（1997）提出了對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的另一種解釋。它對(duì)于腐敗具有負(fù)面效果和積極效果。不同于稅收，腐敗不是透明的，涉及的因素很多，有些更是隨機(jī)的自然因素。行賄和腐敗官員之間達(dá)成的協(xié)議很難執(zhí)行，這樣并創(chuàng)造更多的不確定性，最后總的可疑支付或最終結(jié)果才使其暴露無(wú)疑。偉表明這種類(lèi)型的不確定性

81、會(huì)誘發(fā)腐敗并導(dǎo)致外國(guó)直接投資減少。政府的政治穩(wěn)定，可以成為促進(jìn)流入的外國(guó)直接投資，并為其不確定的政治環(huán)境和其相關(guān)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)創(chuàng)造有利的經(jīng)濟(jì)條件，這也可以成為阻礙外國(guó)直接投資流入的另一個(gè)重要因素。由于腐敗和不穩(wěn)定的指標(biāo)，那些分配指數(shù)少損壞或更穩(wěn)定的國(guó)家將有變成不穩(wěn)定的跡象，腐敗是迅速蔓延的。</p><p>　　當(dāng)然包括在對(duì)分析政策相關(guān)的系數(shù)中，F(xiàn)DI的影響表現(xiàn)對(duì)進(jìn)口關(guān)稅的代理障礙，企業(yè)所得稅稅率，對(duì)外貿(mào)易開(kāi)放稅率的影響

82、上。霍斯特（1971）通過(guò)數(shù)據(jù)證明跨國(guó)企業(yè)（MNEs）的招商引資行為而對(duì)關(guān)稅產(chǎn)生了影響。他預(yù)測(cè)，在面對(duì)由東道國(guó)征收較高的關(guān)稅的同時(shí)，在其他條件相同的情況下，跨國(guó)公司將會(huì)增加其生產(chǎn)國(guó)內(nèi)外引資，而減少其出口。最近的模型很好地模擬了跨國(guó)公司在縱向和橫向?qū)I(yè)化背景下，關(guān)稅對(duì)外國(guó)直接投資的直接影響。一個(gè)典型的FDI可以由個(gè)別子公司專(zhuān)門(mén)從事生產(chǎn)輸出的不同階段的特點(diǎn)。反過(guò)來(lái)的半成品出口到其他子公司作需要進(jìn)一步處理。總部和附屬機(jī)構(gòu)通過(guò)分段生產(chǎn)過(guò)程來(lái)控制

83、不同國(guó)家在生產(chǎn)要素價(jià)格上差距的優(yōu)勢(shì)。另一方面，專(zhuān)業(yè)化水平，涉及各子公司在生產(chǎn)方面的接觸。一個(gè)典型有效的專(zhuān)業(yè)生產(chǎn)水平可以與外國(guó)直接投資的行為結(jié)合起來(lái)，并針對(duì)國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)和經(jīng)濟(jì)機(jī)遇，從而避免高貿(mào)易成本。這也是從事低水平的外國(guó)直接投資或進(jìn)行出口貿(mào)易之間的選擇，將涉及計(jì)算貿(mào)易成本和規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)之間的權(quán)衡?？晒膭?lì)跨國(guó)公司，建立垂直的生產(chǎn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)，在一個(gè)國(guó)家的投資相對(duì)較低的關(guān)稅代理障礙，由于其進(jìn)口的中間產(chǎn)品的成本較低。因此，預(yù)計(jì)原裝進(jìn)口的標(biāo)志是否定的。相比之下

84、，高關(guān)稅貿(mào)</p><p>　　一個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)體系的開(kāi)放的國(guó)際貿(mào)易被列入研究具有一定的重要性。以上一些系數(shù)和原因體現(xiàn)了每個(gè)國(guó)家的一般貿(mào)易限制措施的程度。繼上述理由，開(kāi)放和市場(chǎng)尋求型與FDI預(yù)計(jì)有著正相關(guān)關(guān)系，而與出口導(dǎo)向型的國(guó)家和FDI之間有著負(fù)相關(guān)關(guān)系另一項(xiàng)研究系數(shù)表明，通過(guò)東道國(guó)的企業(yè)或者其他稅率表明服務(wù)型FDI可以影響東道國(guó)的區(qū)位優(yōu)勢(shì)?？鐕?guó)公司作為全球利潤(rùn)最大化，可以認(rèn)為是敏感的稅收因素，因?yàn)樗麄兊亩惵蕦?duì)他們

85、的利潤(rùn)有直接影響。在以往的研究報(bào)告，由偉（1997），Gastanaga，紐金特，Pashamova（1998），和蕭（2001）的研究報(bào)告都證明企業(yè)所得稅稅率是重大負(fù)面影響的證據(jù)。</p><p>　　最后，根據(jù)控制供給方的直接投資，包括流出數(shù)據(jù)，以及占全球外國(guó)直接投資每四年流出量為所有的變量轉(zhuǎn)化數(shù)據(jù)為對(duì)數(shù)。而制定的實(shí)證模型，模型如下</p><p>　　ln(AFDIi,t) = l

86、n(AFDIi,t) = α0 + α1ln(CLNFDI,t) + β1ln(AGROWTHi,t) + β2ln(ACORRUPTi,t) + β3ln(ADUTYi,t) + β4ln(AGOVi,t) + β5ln(AWAGEi,t) +β6ln(AOPENi,t)+β7ln(AILLITi,t) + β8ln(ACPTAXi,t) + β9ln(ATELi,t) + β10ln(AINCOMEi,t) + β11ln(OUTF

87、LOWt) + ui + ei,t</p><p>　　ln(CLNFDIt) == γ0 + δ1ln(AFDIi,t) + ρ1ln(CGROWTHt) + ρ2ln(CCORUPTt) ρ3ln(CDUTYt) + ρ4ln(CGOVt) + ρ5ln(CWAGEt) + ρ6ln(COPEN t) + ρ7ln(CINCOMEt) + vi + wi,t </p><p>　　上述